We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.
Introduction
The main tool in the literature to treat the moral hazard problem 1 is the first order approach (FOA) technique. Several authors have contributed in this direction, in which J.A. Mirrlees was the pioneer (see Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) and Rogerson (1985) ). However, Mirrlees showed that in some cases this technique can not be applied and Rogerson gave some sufficient conditions for it: the density of the output resulting from the agents' action to have monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and the convexity of the distribution function property (CDFP). The first condition has the fairly natural interpretation of more effort, more output, and also serves to imply (when the FOA is valid) that the agents payment is increasing in the observed output (see Milgrom (1981) ). However, the second condition is by no means as easy to accept: most of the distributions commonly occurring in statistics (and economics) do not have the CDFP. Jewitt (1988) provides conditions which justify the FOA in the multi-statistic case and where the CDFP is replaced by conditions that are valid for problems with more than one variable (see also Sinclair-Desgagné (1994) ). In these cases, the agent's utility function in the optimal contract is concave on the action variable and consequently the FOA follows.
In this paper, we obtain the general Lagrange multipliers for this problem which includes the FOA as a particular case. The Lagrangian can be described as follows: besides the multipliers relative to the individual rationality (IR) constraint and the first order condition of the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, there exist a multiplier for the second order condition and a multiplier for the action variables where the IC constraint is binding. Moreover, there is a multiplier for the derivative of the agent's utility function with respect to action in the boundary. Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) present a Lagrangian that is different from ours: he considers a finite dimensional state space and multi-dimensional action setj he does not consider the second order condition of the IC constraintj the boundary conditions do not appear in his Lagrangian (he works with an open action set)j and finally, besides the multipliers of the binding actions of the IC constraint, there exist Lagrange multipliers for their first order conditions. This implies that the number of the variables (multipliers, state variables and action) is greater than the number of equations (the first order conditions of the Lagrangian and the complementary slackness Kuhn and Tucker's conditions) in a finite dimensional state space problemj in our case, these numbers are the same. As Mirrlees has himself pointed out, to follow his approach one has to know in advance the criticaI manifold. This is not the case in our paper: we determine the criticaI point jointly with the Lagrange multipliers. The reason is because Mirrlees uses a local Kuhn and Tucker Theorem in a finite dimensional state space 2 1 F'or a survey in this topic see DuUa and Radner (1994) and Rees (1987) .
2 He needs to put the binding equations of the 10 constraints and their first order conditions a.s the constraints that replace the 10 constraints in order to satisfy the regularity conditions of the Kuhn and Grossman and Hart (1983) established a Lagrangian for finite state space and finite number of action and used it to approximate the solution when there are an infinite number of actions. For each action, we consider (as Grossman and Hart (1983) ) the incentive scheme which minimizes the (expected) cost of inducing the agent to choose that action. Under the assumption that the agent's preferences over income lotteries are independent of the action he takes, we have that this cost minimization problem is a fairly straightforward convex programming problem. The assumption that the agent's preferences over income lotteries are independent of the action is a strong one. Yet it has been used in most of the applications of moral hazard problems. Special cases of this assumption occur when the agent's utility function is additively or multiplicatively separable in action and reward. However, we also obtain a local Kuhn and Tucker Theorem including the action variable without assuming this special type of agent's utility function (in this case we do not have necessarily a concave programming problem).
We provide four examples where the FOA is not valid: In the first one we use the global Kuhn and Tucker Theorem for a given action to solve the cost minimization problem in the state variable and we conclude that in this case the information of the second order condition (besides the first order one) is sufficient to characterize the optimal solution. This is an infinite dimensional example in the state variables, where the Lagrangian approach of Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) is not applicable. The expected utility function is constant in the action variable at the optimal contract, i.e., the agent is indifferent to all feasible actions at the optimal contract and the second order approach works. This example demonstrates the possibility raised by Mirrlees (1986) (see the last paragraph of page 1208). He said that, if there exist infinite states of nature, it is possible to have an optimal contract such that the agents expected utility function is constant on part of the set of feasible actions. The second example follows the same idea, but the number of states is finite and the optimal solution is such that the agent's expected utility presents two maximal points as a function of the action. This example shows the importance of the Lagrange multipliers of the binding actions of the IC constraint.
In the third example, we mn the first order conditions derived from the local Kuhn and Tucker Theorem in the two variables (the action and the state variables) in a Mathematica program: l and we see that the information of multiple maximal actions is important for the characterization of the optimal solution, i.e., the Lagrange multipliers have a non trivial component in a binding action of the IC constraint. This example is standard: there exist two states (the low and high output states), a convex cost function of action (the disutility of the action for the agent) and an additively separable form of the agent's utility functionj the princiTucker Theorem. In our ca.se) we use the Kuhn and Tucker Theorem for infinite dimensional spaces and our regularity conditions are quite different from l\1irrlees'.
:3 Vv'e establish the first order equations and the Kuhn and Tucker's conditions of the Lagrangian of the problem and implement these as a system of nonlinear equations with the equal number of variables and equations and use an algorithm in l\Jathematica to solve the problem. paI is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. The optimal contract is monotone in output. However, the agent's expected utility function is not a concave function of the action variable and there exist two optimal feasible actions for the principal: the lower and the higher onei the optimal action from the viewpoint of the principal is the higher one.
The Mirrlees' counter example is reexamined under our approach: we can provide Lagrange multiplier for the optimal solution of that example. Some classical results in the literature valid under the FOA can be extended in our framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a motivating example for the study of a general Lagrangian approach to the principal-agent problem. In section 3, we present the moral hazard model and the results. Section 4 gives the final conclusions and extensions. Finally, the appendix provides the proofs of the theorems. Assume that the reservation utility of the agent is zero. If the principal observes the action, he can enforce the action as a part of the contract ("the first best problem"). However, we assume that the principal can not observe the agent's action, therefore he should induce the agent to take the action he would relatively prefer ("the second best problem").
An example

(I)
Hence, the principal-agent problem is
The FOA is the substitution (when it is valid) of the 1C constraint by its first order condition (the derivative of V with respect to the action equals to zero). This is not possible in general because when the expected utility is not a concave function of the action (calculated at the optimal contract), the first order condition is not sufficient to characterize the optimal action in the 1C constraint. We need more information: the second order condition, the multiple maxima and the behavior of V (x,·) in the boundary ofthe action set. Our Lagrangian captures al! these aspects.
This example illustrates this case. We claim that the optimal contract is x* = (0,1.23457) and the optimal action is a* = 0.9. If this is true, the expected utility of the agent at x*, V(x*,·) admits exactly two maximal actions: the boundary actions O and 0.9 where V(x*,·) is nul!o We also claim that these properties are sufficient to characterize the optimum. If this is the case, the problem becomes:
Thus, the Lagrangian can be written as
The first order condi tions of the Lagrangian are
The first order conditions are satisfied if and only if xl = O, x2 = 1.23457, a* = 0.9, Àl = 1.62 and!Ll = 0.602222. Moreover, xl, x2 and a* are the unique criticaI points of the Lagrangian for the given values of Àl and !LI and the Lagrangian tends to -CXJ uniformly in a when the norm of (Xl, X2) tends to CXJ. Therefore, given a pair of feasible contract and action (X, a) for the problem (I), it is also feasible for the problem (II) and we have
Hence, (x*, a*) is the solution of the principal-agent problem. Observe that we only use the multiple maxima information (the FOA is not valid here).
The principal welfare is 3.016 and the graphic of the agent's utility function at the optimal contract as a function of action is: Figure 1 In the next section, we present a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard model, even when there exist an infinite number of states of nature.
The main result
The M odel
Let A be a non-degenerated compact interval in iR representing all the possible available actions to the agent. The space of states of nature will be represented by a non-empty set D and A will be a O'-algebra of events on D. Let u: iR ---t iR be the principal's utility function defined over the monetary outcomes which is concave and differentiable, v: I x A ---t iR is the agent's utility function defined over the monetary payoffs and actions, where I is an open interval in iR.
First, we will assume that v(
where S, M: A ---t iR are functions in C 2 (A) and v: I ---t iR is a concave, increasing and differentiable function, i.e., the agents utility function is a von NewmannMorgenstern utility function separable in actions and outcomes. This type of agents utility function was used by Grossman and Hart (1983) .
The subjective beliefs of the principal and the agent about the state of nature subject to the agent's action are the function p:
is a probability measure on (D, A),
We shall assume that the set of all possible contracts is a convex set 5 C of a linear subspace L of the real vector space of all real measurable functions on
Let 7f E L be the principal's monetary outcome which is observed by both the principal and the agent. For each action a E A and contract x E C, the principal and the agent expected utilities are
4 Vv'e can a180 a.ssume different subjective beliefs for the principal and for the agent.
We assume that x( w)
We assume that U, v: C x A ---t !R are well defined, i.e., the integraIs above exist and a E A f--t In v( x( w) )dp( w la) is an element of c 2 (A) for each x E C.
where V is the minimum leveI of utility for the agent.
The first constraint of the problem is a consequence of the non-observability of the action by the principal. It is known as the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. The second constraint is determined by market forces or bargaining power. This is called the individual rationality (IR) constraint.
We separate the above problem into two parts. In the first one we fix an action a* E A and solve the problem:
In the second one we solve:
We are not going to discuss the existence of solution for problems (P), (P') and (P") (for a reference see Grossman and Hart (1983) and Page (1987) ). Our aim is to characterize the solution of problem (P') writing its Lagrangian for a fixed a* E A. By a simple change of variable, we can suppose that v(x) = x, for all x E I. Without loss of generality, we can assume that V = O.
M athematical Framework
Let A be a compact non degenerated interval on !R of the form [º" ai. We denote by C"(A) the space of n times continuously differentiable real functions defined on A, n 2: 0, with the topology of the uniform convergence until the derivative of order n, i.e., given f E ca(A), we define the norm of f by Ilflla = max Ilf(h)II", where Ilfll"
should be clear that F is a closed vector subspace of Cn(A). Let A be the set of all functions in F such that a* is a global minimum which is equivalent to the set of all non-negative functions in F. Thus, A is a positive cone on F. We also define the following concepts: M (A) is the set of all finite measures defined on the Borel sets of A and M+(A) is the non-negative elements of M(A); F* is the topological dual of F with respect to the norm topology and F't is the set of positive elements with respect to the positive cone A (i.e., À E F't if and only if À E F* and À(f) 2: 0, V f E A); C+(A) (respectively C++(A)) is the set ofthe non-negative (respectively positive) continuous functions defined on A.
Let
be the differential and integral operator, respectively. The following lemma characterizes the subspace F and it is easy to prove:
We can be more precise: If n = 2, every function in F with strict global minimum at a* and positive second derivative at a* is an interior point of A. If n = 1 and a* = Q (respectively a* = a), every function in F with strict global minimum at a* and positive (respectively negative) first derivative at a* is an interior point of A. The reciprocal is also true in both cases. By Lemma 3.1, we have that the topological dual of F, F*, is isomorphic to the topological dual of C(A), M(A). Therefore, we can characterize F* using the following lemma (the proof is given in the appendix: 6 ) 
Proof. Since the map
is an isomorphism and F' = F't -F't , the result follows from the previous lemma.
The proof of (ii) is analagous. 
The Lagrangian Approach
Let L be a vector space, C C L be a convex subset and a' E A. Suppose that Because of the assumptions made in the beginning of this section, AI and A2 are easily satisfied. Moreover, since V(· ,a) is an affine map, for all a E A, V(" a), V;, (" a) and V;,,,(,, a) are Gateaux differentiable in C, where V;, and V;,,, are the first and the second derivative of V with respect to a, respectively (the same is valid for U). Moreover, 8V(x,a; .) = 'PC ,a), 8V;,(x , a; .) = 'P"C ,a) and 8V;,,,(x,a; .) = 'P",, (' ,a) , for all x E C and for all a E A, where
The following assumption is necessary:
Assumption A3. There exists a solution x* of (P') which belongs to C.
Before we establish our result we will list two more conditions which will be assumed as hypotheses. Each corresponds to a Slater condition of (P'). 9 And consequently; it is valid for alI X E 6. ,,,(x,a) dp,(a) A and V;,(x*,a*) = O, IA V;,,,(x*,a)dp, (a) 
Condition Ci. There exists Xo
,(x,a)dp,(a) ,a) )dp, ( The proof is gi ven in the appendix.
Theorem 3.0 can be easily generalized to the multidimensional parameter case. However, it is not possible to extend Theorem 3.1 to the multi dimensional case using our method since we are not able to extend Lemma 3.2. (Even though we think that, in the multidimensional case, a similar characterization is possible.)
Corollary. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, if x' is such that V(x', .) has a finite number of maximal points: aI, ... , aK, the Lagmngian becomes
Proof.
We only have to observe that Remark 2. Theorem 3.1 shows that, under the Slater condition (C1 or C2), the problem (P) has a Lagrangian.
Mirrlees and Roberts (1980) have the following result:
For almost all 12 C= function V the number of distinct maxima in a variable is less than or equal to n + 2 for all x E 6, and the dimension of the surface {(x, a) E 6 x A. i V;,(x, a) = O} corresponding to x with r distinct maxima is less than or equal to n + 1 -r, where n is the dimension of L (in the case of finite dimensional vector space).
Therefore, the remark above can be used for almost all functions V. However, our example 1 shows that this is not always the case.
12 The set of such funct ions contains a countable intersec~tion of dense sets in the Vv'hitney or strong topology.
Now we are going to characterize the problem (P) in the variables x and a together. We give a local characterization of the optimal for the problem (P) (since this is not a concave problem in general).
Assume that there exists a solution (x*, a*) E 6 x A of the problem (P) and U( . , . ) is Gateaux differentiable in (x, a) with linear differential. Label AI' the assumption AI without the concavity hypothesis. Suppose that V is a generic function (not necessarily affine in x) such that
Assumption A2,B 8V;, is a continuous function along each direction of L x !R and V(x, . ): A ---t !R is a function in C 2 (A), for all x EC.
The correspondent Slater condition is The remarks following Theorem 3.1 can be also applied in the case of Theorem 3.2.
Condition C3. There exists hO E L x !R such that V(x*, a*) + 8 h o V(x*, a*) > O and V(x*,a*) -V(x*,·) + 8 h o(V(x*,a*) -V(x*,·)) E int(A). lf a* E (Q,a),
Related Literature
In the existing literature, we have two conditions that guarantee the so called FOA: the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and the convexity of the 1:3 Now 8 represents the Gateaux differential in the variables X and a together. 14 L:e represents the Gateaux differential with respect to the variable x. distribution function property (CDFP). MRLP has the fairly natural interpretation that a (first best) costly action increases the probability of high outcome than a less costly one. CDFP is not as easy to accept, most of the distributions commonly occurring in statistics do not have this property. For instance, suppose that output is subject to a simple additive disturbance E with distribution F, and effort is measured in output terms. The realized output is given by x = a + E, and E has distribution function F(x -a) which is convex in effort if and only if E has an increasing density. Rogerson (1985) shows that, in the presence of MRLP and CDFP, the agent's utility function is a concave function of the action at the optimal contract and therefore the first order condition of the IC constraint is sufficient to characterize IC. From the complementary slackness Kuhn and Tucker conditions of Theorem 3.2, the FOA is also obtained in our framework. Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) has an example in which the FOA is not valid which we are going to reexamine. We present two more examples in which the FOA can not be applied.
The multipliers of the Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 have a quite simple meaning: )'1 represents the IR constraint multiplierj '\2 represents the multiplier of the first order condition ofthe IC constraintj ao is associated with the second order condition ofthe IC constraint in the case ofTheorem 3.1 (i) and with the first order condition in the case of Theorem 3.1 (ii)j ai (i = 1,2) is the multiplier associated to the effect of the first derivative of the agent's expected utility function with respect to the action in the boundary of A, º' and a, whether º' and a belong to the set of the binding actions of the IC constraint. Finally, the measure fJ. represents the multiplier which captures the information of multi pIe maxima because, by the complementary slackness Kuhn and Tucker conditions, fJ. has support on the set of the binding actions of the IC constraint. Therefore, besides the usual terms in the FOA Lagrangian, in the general case we have to consider the second order effect, the binding actions of the IC constraint and the behavior of the first derivative of V(x*, . ) on the boundary of A. Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) also has a Lagrangian approach with the following differences from ours: he deals with a finite dimensional state space and multi pIe action variables and we treat the general state space case with an one-dimensional action variable (even though we have a Lagrangian form for multiple dimensional case. See the theorem in the appendix). In the Mirrlees' Lagrangian the multiplier of the second order condition is absent because he assumes that all criticaI action are non-degenerated 15 (i.e., \1;"". is non-degenerated for all criticaI points, i.e., \1;,. = O) and the multipliers of the first derivative at the boundary is also absent because Mirrlees assumes that the action set is open.
However, the main difference is that Mirrlees' Lagrangian has multipliers for the first order condition of the agent's utility function at each binding action. This implies that the number of variables is greater than the number of equations for the system generated by the first order condi tion of the Lagrangian and the complementary slackness Kuhn and Tucker conditions. In our case the number of the variables is the same of the equations.
Observe that the first order conditions of the binding actions of the IC constraint are actually redundant as constraints because if the action is binding in the IC constraint, then it automatically satisfies the first order condition. Mirrlees used these conditions as constraints (additionally with the equations of the binding IC constraints) for regularity reasons of the Kuhn and Tucker Theorem (see the introduction) and this is why the match of equations and variables does not occur in his case. In our case we do not need to use these conditions as constraints for the Lagrangian, but we use them as additional equations. The result is that we obtain the match of the number of equations and variables. 16 And finally, he does not cover our Theorem 3.1 (ii) and Theorem 3.2 when the optimal action is in the boundary of the action interval. Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) also observe that when the state space is infinite dimensional, it would be possible to have the agent indifferent with respect to a continuous set of action at the optimum. Our example 1 below illustrates this possibility: the agent is indifferent to all the actions in the feasible domain.
In what follows, we give four examples where the FOA is not valido The second example is the example of section 2. In the third example, we use a Mathematica program to compute optimal solutions using the first order conditions of the Lagrangian and the complementary slackness Kuhn and Tucker conditions of .2 Fix a* E (0,1). By Theorem 3.1, the associated problem (P') has the fol!owing Lagrangian: *) -aoV;,,,(x,a*) where '\1 2: O, '\2 E !R and ao 2: O. (Assume, for a while, that the Lagrange multipliers aI, a2 and the measure fJ. of Theorem 3.1 are nul!.)
If x* E C is a solution of the problem then (x*, '\1, '\2, ao) is a saddle point of the Lagrangian, i.e.,
where L"n represents the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the variable Xn· Therefore, we can rewrite (I') to (IV') as
ao(L(x~+2 -2X~+1 + x~)p(nla*) + 2) = O, ao 2: O. Hence, the optimal solution is * 3 2 X n = n -n , n = O, 1,2, ...
Observe that )'1, '\2, ao and x* satisfy the optimality conditions. Therefore, x* is the solution of our problem. Observe also that x* is independent of a*. It is straightforward to conclude that the agent is indifferent to all actions at the optimal contract, i.e., V(x*, .) = O. Since ao = a â > O we can say that the second order approach is valid here.
Moreover, MLRP is satisfied but CDFP is noto It is easy to see that the solution x** obtained by the FOA is x~* = a*2 + 2(1 -a*)n and V(x**, a) = (a -a*)2 which does not satisfy the IC constraint: lndeed, a* minimizes V(x**, . ).
4
-('~ + Suppose that the principal would like to induce effort 2, i.e., he would like to solve problem (P') for a* = 2. Proceeding as in the example 1 above we have the following results:
Observe that the FOA is not valid because fJ. is non-null (it is a multiple of the Dirac measure at the 4). The figure below is the agent's expected utility at the optimal contract as a function of the action: Figure 2 Observe that at the optimal contract the agent is indifferent between two efforts (2 and 4), however from the principal's point of view the better effort is the low one. In Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) , there is an important example showing that the FOA is not valid in general. Under the light of what we said in this paper, how can we solve such example?
The example is: Let
17 Using the Kuhn and Tucker's conditions and the first order conditions of the Lagrangian and separating the items (i) and (ii) of Theorem :3.2) we have 20 poasible nonlinear systems. Vv'e calculate the criticaI points of these systems (when they exist) and selec~t the one that maximizes the principal's expected utility function.
V(x,a) = xe-(o,+1)2 + e-(o,-1)2
where x E iR and a E iR.
18 Suppose that there is no uncertainty and the reservation utility is 17= -CXJ (i.e., there is no IR constraint).
In Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) , the solution is shown to be x* = 1 and a* = 0.957 and the first order approach can not be applied. However, V(x,·) has just one (regular) maximum, for all x # 1. Therefore, by our previous analysis, if x* # 1 were the solution, then the FOA would be valido As long as this is not true, the unique viable solution is x* = 1.
Observe that V(l,·) has two maximal points: -0.957 and 0.957 and it is also easy to find the Lagrange multipliers such that (1,0.957) is the unique criticaI point of
with V;,(x, a) = V;, (x, aI) = O and V(x, a) = V(x, aI) (where aI can be shown to be -0.957).
The main feature of this example is its robustness: one can make a small perturbation of the principal's and the agent's utility function and obtain the same type of solution. This means that, even though the FOA is very frequent in the literature, one can not neglet situations where FOA is not valido Some results in the literature, valid under FOA, can be easily generalized under our framework. We give three applications:
(1) Holmstrom (1979) showed that '\2 2: O under FOA. However, our examples 1 and 2 show that '\2 can be negative in some cases.
(2) Using Theorem 3.2, we can easily prove that if the MLRP holds and the optimal action is the supreme of the binding action set of the IC constraint, then the optimal contract should be monotone.
(3) Let s be a random variable representing a signal. We can show that the return 7f is sufficient for (7f, s) with respect to a E A if and only if the distribution of 7f and s given a j(7f, sla) is multiplicatively separable in s and a, l.e., We say that s is informative about a E A whenever x is not sufficient for (7f, s) with respect to a E A. Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) showed that there exists a new contract using s that strictly Pareto dominates the optimal contract without using s if and only if s is informative about a E A.
We can easily extend this result under our assumptions (see the proof in the references and use our Lagrangian approach to do the extension).
Conclusions
18 lndeed) we can restrict our attention to a compact interval in tR without 10&s of generality.
In this paper we studied a general characterization of optimal solutions for the moral hazard problem when the set of parameters is a compact interval in the real line. We obtained a Lagrangian for the infinite dimensional state space. In the finite state space case, our approach matches the numbers of equations and variables of the first order conditions of the Lagrangian which does not happen in the case of Mirrlees (1975) and (1986) .
and a ---t cp(a -b) is an odd function, where 8 = (E -17)/2. Define f = f2(cp). Rudin (1974) , Theorem 8.6). Taking cp' in the place of cp, b E A -{a*} in the proof of Lemma 2 (i) and integrating by parts in the distributional sense (see Rudin (1991) for the defini tions): 
Using Lemma 2 (i) we conelude the proof
The proof of (ii) is analogous, D Proof of Theorem 3,0, We will only prove (i) because the proof of (ii) is analogous,
We have to consider two cases:
Then the following problem is equivalent to (P'):
By the Slater condition Cl, Kuhn and Tucker Theorem (see Luenberger The term -f ç"l! is considered a.s a part of J A f dp,.
To complete the proof we only have to guarantee the existence of Lagrange multi pliers for the pro blem Under assumptions A1-A3 and C1, this is the case, i.e., there exists À 2 E !R such that x* is a criticaI point of L(x, a*). Since L( " a*) is a concave functional, x* is a global maximum of L(x, a*).
(b) Assume C2. If V(x*, a*) = O, the proof is analogous to the proof of (a).
Suppose that V(x*,a*) > O. Then x* E iJ (because Ve,a*) is an affine map) which implies that (P') is equivalent to the problem: It is easy to see that f,gl,g2,g:l are affine functions. 
